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July 6, 2018 
 
Abstract 
This study divides the world into currency zones according to the co-movement of each currency with the 
key currencies. The dollar zone groups economies that produce well over half of global GDP. The euro 
zone now includes almost all of Europe and some commodity producers, but remains less than half the size 
of the dollar zone. The dollar zone share has shown striking stability despite big shifts across zones over 
time. These include the demise of the sterling zone and the expansion of the DM/euro from northwestern 
Europe to Europe and beyond. Global imbalances look very different from a currency perspective. In the 
2000s, the dollar zone’s current account improved as the dollar depreciated, even as the US current account 
plumbed all-time lows. Thus, the Mundell-Fleming relationship between the exchange rate and the current 
account held up for the dollar zone but not the US economy. The dollar zone NIIP showed net wealth 
in ????. Thus, neither flow not stock readings support widespread predictions in the early 2000s of an 
imminent dollar crash. In fact, most of the secular widening of current accounts occurred within currency 
zones, where by definition investors bear limited currency risk. Our account of the dollar’s dominance 
rests not on the US economy’s size but rather on the size of the zone with limited currency risk vis-a-is the 
dollar. In such a world, the rise of another large economy poses the question not of relative size but rather 
of re-alignment of third currencies. What if the renminbi becomes a key currency alongside the dollar and 
the euro? Already some emerging market currencies are co-moving with the renminbi against the dollar. 
On current evidence, a renminbi zone would shrink the dollar zone, widen its current account deficit and 
leave it with a negative NIIP. 
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The standard view of global imbalances focuses on current accounts by country. Figure 1 plots 
surpluses and deficits as positive and negative percentages of global GDP, over the period of 
generalised floating in 1973 and extending out to 2023 using IMF projections.  
Observers take the imbalances to be unsustainable and subject to disorderly and costly 
“correction” when they reach a substantial share of global GDP. Thus, when the deficits 
reached 1% of global GDP in the mid-1980s, and the US deficit hit 3% of US GDP, major 
countries negotiated macroeconomic and exchange rate policy changes to reduce them. When 
the deficits reached almost 1½% of global GDP in the mid-2000s, and over 5% of US GDP, 
leading international economists warned of a sharp decline in the US dollar’s value, or even a 
dollar crisis. Krugman (2007) foresaw the dollar reaching its Wylie E Coyote moment, when 
its lack of fundamental support would become evident and its fall would be rapid (see also 
Summers (2004), Edwards (2005), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) and Setser and Roubini (2005)). 
Following Avdjiev et al (2016), we insist that use of the major currencies, notably the dollar 
and the euro, spans national borders. The burden of our argument is that the US current account 
cannot be analysed in isolation, but only in relation to that of the dollar zone defined by 
economies with currencies that are relatively stable against the dollar. Such stability implies 
investing and borrowing in dollars incurs less currency risk than doing so in the euro or yen. 
Indeed, investors show “zone bias” in the currency composition of their portfolios. Because 
key currencies anchor other currencies and external portfolios show “zone bias”, global 
imbalances require a zone, not national, analysis.   
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
A historical analogy is the sterling area that came into existence in the 1930s and persisted 
into the 1970s (Schenk (2010)). As long as economies like Australia, India, Portugal, Sweden 
and New Zealand borrowed in sterling, held official reserves in sterling, and placed private 
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investments in sterling, then the relevant current account for sterling was that of the sterling 
area, not that of the United Kingdom (Drummond (2008)).  
Our argument advances in four steps. First, using the inductive technique of Haldane and 
Hall (1991) and Frankel and Wei (1996) and following Kawai and Akiyama (1998, 2000), 
McCauley and Chan (2014), BIS (2015) and Ito and Kawai (2016), we divide economies into 
currency zones according to the co-movement of currencies. An economy forms part of the 
dollar zone not only if its currency is pegged to the dollar, but also to the extent that its floating 
currency varies less against the dollar than against euro, yen or sterling. As discussed below, 
this can result not only from exchange rate policy but also from follow-the-leader monetary 
policy. It can also arise from market forces, operating against the backdrop of trade links in 
accord with the gravity model. 
Our first major finding is that the dollar zone emerges as covering 50-60% of the world 
economy, not just the US economy’s share at a fifth or a quarter. This share is smaller than that 
of Iltzeki et al (2017), who find that the dollar zone covers XX%, but similar to that of Tovar 
and Nor (2018) when they use the same technique at 60%. We observe this consistently despite 
major tectonic shifts. The sterling zone disappeared by the 1970s. And the Deutsche mark and 
later the euro zone spread out from its core in north western Europe and in recent years gained 
at least partial adherence from commodity currencies.  
Second, we then allocate each country’s current account and international investment 
positions to the four (and then three) zones according to its currency’s loading on the key 
currencies. We thereby reduce the dimension of global imbalances from N economies to 3-4 
currency zones. 
Our second major finding is that surpluses elsewhere in the dollar zone have offset the US 
current account deficit to a varying but often significant extent. As a result, the time profile of 
the dollar zone’s current account very much differs from its US counterpart. In particular, after 
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the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, growing surpluses in dollar-anchored Asia offset the 
widening of US deficits. Indeed, on the eve of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2007, when 
many feared a dollar collapse, the dollar zone was nearing a balanced current account. 
Third, we then decompose global imbalances into imbalances between zones and those 
within zones. Observers interpreted the widening of the sum of absolute values of current 
accounts before the GFC as evidence for the globalisation of portfolios. 
Our third major finding is that the secular widening of global imbalances before the GFC 
(Faruqee and Lee (2009)) took place mostly within and not between currency zones. Positions 
within currency zones by definition imply less currency risk, so our finding qualifies the 
inference of more globalised portfolios from the original observation. Moreover, since the GFC, 
the much-remarked narrowing of global imbalances occurred only within zones. Imbalances 
across zones have persisted, requiring positions . 
Fourth, we assess the consequences of the renminbi becoming a key currency, a possibility 
investigated by Subramanian and Kessler (2013), Fratzscher and Mehl (2014), Eichengreen 
and Lombardi, Ito (2017) and Marconi (2017). For the purpose of this exercise, we suspend 
our prior that only the dollar, euro and yen show the trading volumes (means of payment) and 
uses as unit of account and store of value that qualify them as key currencies. We consider 
observations from 2015-2017. In this period, the IMF designated the renminbi as a constituent 
of the SDR, and the August 2015 reform of the renminbi fixing marked a structural break in 
the strength of co-movements between the renminbi and other emerging currencies (McCauley 
and Shu (2018)). 
Our fourth major finding is that the renminbi as a key currency would shrink the dollar 
zone, widen its current account and reduce its net international investment position. If the 
dollar’s role includes its use as an anchor for the Chinese currency, then the answer to “The 
international role of the dollar: does it matter if this changes?” (Goldberg (2011)) must be yes. 
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This study joins recent work that emphasises the global uses of the dollar and their 
interdependence. As noted, Iltzeki et al (2017) also identify currency anchors using a different 
technique and find predominance of the dollar in this role. Gopinath and Stein (2018) 
emphasise dollar invoicing as a driver of the dollar share of official foreign exchange reserves; 
Ito et al (2015) considered dollar anchoring of currencies as an alternative driver. The emphasis 
of this body of work on the dollar’s external role as anchor or unit of account differs from the 
conventional approach, as seen in Eichengreen, et al (2017), of using the size of the US 
economy as the driver of the dollar share of official foreign exchange reserves. 
The rest of this paper is in five sections. Section 2 uses exchange rates to estimate the 
weights of the key currencies for every other currency and then uses these weights to form 
currency zones. Section 3 aggregates individual economies’ current accounts and external 
positions into currency zone current accounts and external positions. Section 4 decomposes 
global imbalances into those across zones and those within zones. Section 5 reports on the 
renminbi taken as a key currency. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Estimating currency zones  
This section divides the world economy output into currency zones, finding that the US dollar 
zone accounts for a fairly consistent 50-60% of world GDP. This consistency arises 
notwithstanding systematic movement of currencies from the dollar to the Deutsche mark/euro 
zone over time. The relatively stable dollar zone share arises from systematically faster growth 
in the dollar zone that offsets its geographic shrinkage. 
We first need to estimate how much each currency co-moves with the US dollar, the euro 
(or the Deutsche mark before 19993), the Japanese yen and the British pound. Our choice of 
these key currencies is a prior that reflects their status as the most traded currencies in the 
                                                     
3  Before the euro, the SDR included the French franc,,suggesting that it and the Deutsche mark be treated 
symmetrically. However, both its parity changes under Bretton Woods and subsequent performance in the 
ERM point to what Fratzscher and Mehl (2014) call Deutsche mark dominance.  
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Triennial Survey of foreign exchange. From 1999 to 2015, they comprised the IMF’s Special 
Drawing Right (SDR), which the renminbi joined in that year. We drop the sterling after the 
demise of its zone in 1976. (We return to the renminbi in Section 5 below.) 
The co-movement of currencies arises from exchange rate policy, monetary policy and 
underlying trade relations. Policy fixes the Hong Kong dollar or the Bulgarian lev against the 
dollar and the euro, respectively. Policy also governs the Singapore dollar, managing it against 
its trade-weighted basket. The authorities may intervene in the market less systematically to 
stabilise the dollar exchange rate, as in Dooley et al (2004). Elsewhere, the setting of policy 
interest rates with reference to that of a major central bank can link the two exchange rates 
policy (Hofmann and Bogdanova (2012); Hofmann and Takáts (2015)). For instance, the 
Norges Bank explicitly discusses the spread of its policy rate over that of the ECB, and the 
kroner shares most of the euro’s moves against the dollar. Trading relations matter as well: the 
Mexican peso (the Polish zloty) tends to co-move with the dollar (euro), consistent with the 
predominant trading partner. 
The key currency weights for each currency for each time period are estimated using a 
method based on Haldane and Hall (1991) and Frankel and Wei (1996).4  The estimated 
weights indicate the extent that an economy belongs to each zone.5 
More specifically, we run the following estimation model: 
∆𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑖 $⁄ = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖€𝑡∆𝑒𝑖𝑡
€ $⁄ + 𝛽𝑖¥𝑡∆𝑒𝑖𝑡
¥ $⁄ + 𝛽𝑖£𝑡∆𝑒𝑖𝑡
₤ $⁄ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
Here, 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑖/$
 is the nominal exchange rate of home currency i, against the dollar (USD) while  
𝑒𝑖𝑡
ℎ $⁄
 on the right-hand side of the equation is the exchange rate of the euro (DM before 1999), 
yen and the British pound against the dollar. The movements of each currency against the dollar 
                                                     
4 Haldane and Hall (1991) applied their technique to sterling over a period that included both Bank of England 
management and relatively free floating, while Frankel and Wei (1996) sought to discover weights in an 
undisclosed official basket. Among many others, Bénassy-Quéré et al (2006), Ito and Kawai (2016), Kawai and 
Akiyama (1998, 2000) and Kawai and Pontines (2015) applied this method.  
5 Before the introduction of the euro in 1999, we treat the weight of the Deutsche mark as the euro zone weight.  
7 
 
on the left-hand side are reduced to a weighted average of the movements of the euro, yen and 
pound against the dollar on the right-hand side, leaving a residual of idiosyncratic movement. 
Thus,  the estimated coefficient on the rate of change in the exchange rate of key currency 
h vis-à-vis the US dollar, represents the weight of currency h in the behavioural basket. The 
dollar’s weight is calculated as ?̂?𝑖$𝑡 = 1 − (?̂?𝑖€𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖¥𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖£𝑡). If the currency is pegged to 
the US dollar (eg the Hong Kong dollar), then  so that ?̂?𝑖$𝑡 = 1. Similarly, for 
an economy with its currency pegged to the euro (such as the Bulgarian lev), ?̂?𝑖€𝑡=1. When 
the Russian rouble tracked a half-dollar, half-euro basket, the regression produced two 
estimated betas of one-half for the dollar and the euro.  
We apply the estimation model to each of our 172 sample economies (see Appendix 1) for 
1970-2017 over rolling windows of 36 months. Hence, the coefficients ?̂?𝑖ℎ𝑡 are time-varying 
in monthly frequency. This regression is not run for the key currencies; instead, their currency 
weights are set at the value of one. That is, each of the home country of the key currencies is 
assumed to centre its own currency zone without depending on other major-currency exchange 
rates. 
Before showing the results, we address three questions that equation 1 provokes. These 
concern the use of the dollar as numeraire, the significance of the estimates and the monthly 
frequency of the data.  
Does using the dollar as numeraire load the dice in favour of finding a larger dollar zone? 
No is the answer. Ma and McCauley (2011) demonstrate that the same results obtain whether 
the dollar or the SDR is used as the numeraire. In particular, could the choice of the dollar as 
numeraire spuriously include floating currencies in the dollar zone? Again, no is the answer.  
Consider sterling, which has floated cleanly, ie without official intervention, since 1992. 










movement with the Deutsche mark rose from the mid-1970s to 1989. Since then, co-movement 
with the Deutsche mark/euro has varied, averaging around 0.6, in line with the share of the 
euro area in UK trade. Sterling’s varying co-movements demonstrate that a floating exchange 
rate does not place a currency in the dollar zone. In principle, the degree of flexibility and the 
currency anchoring are separate questions. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Should we worry about the significance of the estimates? In principle, yes, but this interacts 
with the choice of numeraire and data frequency. The use of the Swiss franc in the literature 
appealed to the sense of a small, neutral country and currency, but in fact served to make all 
the estimated betas highly significant. Given the predominance of the dollar as an anchor, the 
choice of a numeraire as volatile as possible against the dollar, ie the Swiss franc, produced 
significance.6 By the same token, using the dollar as numeraire, the absence of a response of 
the Hong Kong dollar/US dollar rate to the euro/dollar or yen/dollar is precisely evidence of its 
dollar link. 
Our use of monthly data involves a defensible trade-off. Certainly, the more concern for 
statistical significance, the worse the choice. But it allows us to analyse all the economies in 
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics in a comparable fashion. No doubt, the 
identification of turning points where a currency leaves one zone and joins another requires 
higher frequency data. But our goal of a systemic account of global imbalances is a slower-
moving macroeconomic purpose, and monthly data are fit for it.  
Figure 3 shows currency geography as of four dates from the last days of Bretton Woods 
until now: 1969, 1985, 2001 and 2017. Three systematic changes over time in currency 
geography emerge. 
                                                     
6  Of course, researchers had to construct, because they could not observe, Swiss franc exchange rates, and 
typically in doing so used non-simultaneous observations of exchange rates. Such errors in variables served 
to lower parameter estimates, especially using daily data.  
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[Insert Figure 3 here] 
First, the sterling zone disappeared in the 1970s. The top panel shows the sterling zone in 
1969; the countries included followed sterling in its 1967 devaluation. By the mid-1970s it had 
shrunk to little more than the United Kingdom (Schenk (2009, 2010), Schenk and Singleton 
(2015)). Moreover, Haldane and Hall (1991), writing at the Bank of England, conceived of 
sterling as trading between the dollar and the Deutsche mark starting in 1976. Invoking our 
observations, Schenk’s narratives and Bank of England authority, we drop sterling from our 
key currencies as of 1976. By contrast, we retain the yen in our regressions on the strength of 
its number three position in foreign exchange turnover, even though the yen zone never gained 
much ground beyond Japan.  
Second, the Deutsche mark and then the euro zone solidified its hold in Western Europe 
and spread eastward in the 1990s and 2000s. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the authorities 
managed currencies like the Czech crown and Polish zloty against baskets including the dollar 
and the Deutsche mark (McCauley (1997)). As these currencies moved to floating, their 
economies integrated with the euro area, and their monetary policies reacted to the ECB’s, they 
joined the euro zone. The same story may apply with a lag to the Russian rouble.  
Third, starting in the 1990s the commodity currencies tended to move from a position 
squarely in the dollar zone to a more intermediate position between the dollar and the euro. 
Figure 2, right-hand panel, shows this for the Australian dollar, Brazilian real, the Canadian 
dollar, the Russian rouble and the South African rand. Timing and extent vary but the overall 
upward movement on the euro’s estimated coefficient is striking. Intriguingly, “fair value” 
regressions for commodity currencies run by such central banks and outside economists assign 
powerful roles to the terms of trade, which are in turn dominated by commodity prices 
(Kohlscheen, et al (2017)). Could it be that the formation of the euro made for a larger euro 
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zone and a more powerful effect of the euro on commodity prices and through them to 
commodity currencies? The answer lies outside the scope of this paper.  
Combining currency geography and GDP by jurisdiction7 shows that the dollar and euro 
zones extend well beyond the home jurisdictions (Figure 4)). (As noted, the yen zone, not 
shown, never extended much beyond Japan, and Japan’s economy represents a declining share 
of world GDP.) The gradual decline of the US and euro area economies’ global GDP shares is 
in both cases offset by growth of the share in the rest of the zone.  
Given the geographical extension of the Deutsche mark and euro evident in Figure 3, it is 
at first blush puzzling that the dollar zone has retained a 50-60% share of global activity. The 
solution is found in unbalanced growth. East Asia has grown faster from a starting point in the 
dollar zone and, Singapore apart, has moved only gradually into an intermediate position 
between the dollar and the euro. (For views of each of the four currency zones, see Appendix 
3.) 
3. Currency zone current accounts and external positions 
This first section presents and discusses current accounts of the four currency zones. Then we 
use them to re-interpret the evidence that current accounts in aggregate have widened over time. 
Then we show how the net international investment positions of the currency zones underscore 
the distinction drawn above between US and dollar zone imbalances. Finally, we draw the 
implications of the IMF forecasts for current accounts through 2023 for the current accounts of 
the four currency zones. 
3.1 Currency zone current accounts 
Using the estimated weights for country i in year t for currency zone h as where 
, we can divide the current account balance of country i into the four key currency 
                                                     
7  We apportion economies to currency areas proportionally, unlike Ilzetzki et al (2017) in whose analysis the 










zones (ie ). For currency zone h, country i's currency zone current 
account balance (CZ-CAB) is .  
Figure 5 shows the contribution to the four currency zones of the dollar current account 
balances (expressed as percentages of world GDP at market values) of China, Japan, United 
States, the Euro area, the other advanced economies, oil exporters, emerging Asia, and the rest 









 for major country i for the dollar, the euro, the yen, and the pound zones.9 In 
each panel of the graph, the solid black line indicates the current account balances of each 
currency zone. We take away three observations about the currency zone current account 
balances:10 the contrast between the dollar zone and US current accounts; the profile of the 
euro zone balances; and a contrast between current account adjustment to crises in the dollar 
and euro zones. 
[Insert Figure 5] 
 First, the dollar zone current account (the black line) contrasts sharply with the US 
current account (the blue bars) after the late 1990s. Thus, the United States began to run current 
account deficits in the early 1980s and they widened in the years from 2003 through 2007, 
averaging 1.3 to 1.4 of world GDP (Figures 1 and 5(a)). Then international economists started 
sounding the alarm about the sustainability of the US current account deficit and the possibility 
of a dollar plunge and unemployment in services on the way back to current account 
sustainability.  
                                                     
8 We follow the IMF’s definition of country groups. Appendix 1 lists our sample countries.  
9 For 2017-2023, we apply the 2017 currency weights to current account balances forecasted by the IMF. 
10 Since we do not regard the sterling as one of the key currencies after 1975, we omit showing the sterling zone 








However, the current account of the dollar zone flattened out at less than 1% of global GDP 
after the Asian Financial Crisis and subsequently narrowed to approach balance in 2007 on the 
eve of the crisis (Panel (a) of Figure 5).11 In the years before and after the GFC, the surpluses 
elsewhere in the dollar zone, in China, elsewhere in emerging Asia and in oil exporters, offset 
the US current account deficits.12 Thus, while the national US current account reached its all-
time widest in 2006, the dollar zone current account never reached its widest in 1986. On this 
view, what were called global imbalances were actually imbalances within the dollar zone. 
There, the net wealth transfers went from one set of investors with a home bias towards the 
dollar to another set of investors with a zone bias to the dollar.  
With the dollar zone near current account balance on the eve of the GFC, the rapid 
appreciation of the dollar in 2008-09 in the immediate aftermath of the GFC’s outbreak was 
not surprising. Moreover, as we demonstrate below, its international investment position was 
also near balance. 
Second, the euro zone (and before it, the DM zone) has run surpluses except after the 
second oil shock and German re-unification. That said, its recent surpluses have no precedent. 
Again, the crisis of 2010-11 was a crisis at the centre of a currency zone, this time the euro 
area. The shift to surplus in the euro area was not offset by developments elsewhere in the euro 
zone. Thus, while the post-crisis narrowing of the US current account deficit left the larger 
dollar zone near balance, the similar increase in the euro area’s surplus put the euro zone in 
record surplus. 
Third, the current account adjustment to the wake of the recent euro area sovereign crisis 
differs from the pattern observed after crises in the dollar zone. There, whether the periphery, 
as in 1982 and 1997, or the centre, as in 2007-08, serves as crisis epicentre, current accounts 
                                                     
11 Current account balances are subject to errors and omissions, so that current accounts in Figure 3 do not add up 
at zero. Currency zones’ balances may also be affected by errors and omissions.  
12  Contrast to the savings glut of Bernanke (2005), a non-monetary model with unspecified source of 
Asian preference for US investment.  
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redistribute themselves within the dollar zone. Thus, when commercial banks cut off credit to 
Mexico, Brazil and Argentina in 1982, a US current account deficit appeared and widened to 
allow the Latin American current accounts to narrow. Whereas before 1982, the US current 
account was hardly contributing to the dollar zone deficit, by 1984-85, the US current account 
deficit had grown to account for almost its entirety. Again, when commercial banks cut off 
credit to Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea in 1997-98, the US current account deficit 
widened to absorb the East Asian current accounts swing into surplus. 13  Thus, when 
commercial banks and bond investors cut off credit to highly leveraged US households in 2007-
08, a narrowing of surpluses in East Asia, especially China, and those of oil-exporting countries 
allowed a substantial narrowing of the US current account deficit. In contrast, after commercial 
banks cut off borrowers in peripheral Europe in 2011-12, the current account of neither core 
Europe nor the euro zone outside the euro area accommodated peripheral Europe’s swing from 
deficit to surplus. As a result, the euro zone’s current account swung into an unprecedented 
surplus of one-half of one percent of world GDP. 
3.2 Currency zone investment positions 
Deriving in like fashion net investment positions for currency zones,14 we find a dollar zone 
position that reinforces the message above of near balance in the dollar zone current account 
in 2007. Valuation effects apart, current account balances cumulate into net investment 
positions. Net investment positions – stocks rather than flows – matter because portfolio theory 
points to the interaction of home bias and the distribution of wealth. Even as the dollar zone 
ran a balanced current account in the mid-2000s, a large international investment liability could 
have left it vulnerable to changes in investors’ expectations. 
                                                     
13 Gruber and Kamin (2007) use a crisis dummy to explain the post-1997 widening of current account surpluses 
in East Asia. 
14 See Appendix 3 for gross investment positions by currency zone.CUT? AGREE 
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We start by showing the conventional net investment positions of the same countries and 
country groups as above (Figure 6, based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007 and 2017)). 
Owing to current account deficits, the United States became a debtor country in 1985 (strictly 
speaking a country with net international investment liabilities, including equity positions). It 
has since unevenly accumulated larger net liabilities, which have reached over 10% of global 
GDP. As in Tille (2003), the US borrows dollars to invest in assets denominated in other 
currencies, so the depreciation of the dollar from 2002-10 reduced its net liabilities, despite 
ongoing deficits. The dollar’s appreciation since then has boosted US liabilities. In aggregate, 
what became the euro area has been a debtor since German re-unification in the early 1990s, 
but euro area surpluses after the sovereign credit strains of 2011-12 have brought the position 
to near zero (Fidora and Schmitz (2018)).15 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
To some extent, Japan’s position has been a mirror image of that of the United States, as 
its creditor position has unevenly increased since the early 1980s. Oil exporters have been 
persistent creditors since the first oil shock of 1973, and their positions have increased, 
especially in the second half of the 2000s. China joined the creditor countries in the mid-2000s, 
but the scale of its position has not reached that of Japan.  
Net investment positions look different on a zone basis for the dollar but not for the euro. 
The dollar’s role as a funding currency for the rest of the world is evident in the dollar zone’s 
negative international investment position in the mid-1970s and into the 1980s, even before the 
United States incurred net liabilities. More recently, we find that the dollar zone’s net 
international investment position was approaching balance before the GFC, after a long 
deterioration in the 1980s and 1990s (Figure 7, panel a). This reflected not only the dollar effect 
                                                     
15  Milesi-Ferretti et al (2010) suggests that systematic undercounting of euro area holdings of portfolio equity 




just alluded to, but also the rapid growth of China’s net international assets. Thus, around the 
GFC, economies with currencies that were relatively stable against the dollar in Asia and the 
Middle East had net international asset positions that offset the US net international liability. 
The dollar zone’s net investment position offers another piece of evidence that the emphasis 
on global imbalances at the national level before the GFC might well have been misplaced.  
 [Insert Figure 7 here] 
The dollar zone provides a new perspective on the evolution of international asset positions 
in the crisis year of 2008. Against economist’s predictions, the outbreak of the acute phase of 
the GFC saw the dollar appreciate sharply (McCauley and McGuire (2010)). This caused the 
US net international liabilities to balloon (Benetrix et al (2015), providing what Gourinchas et 
al (2010) call insurance in times of stress. A key observation in Figure 7 is that the US position 
deteriorates in 2008 (blue bar lengthens) by more than that of the dollar zone (decline in black 
line). The difference shows that members of the dollar zone receive much of the payout on the 
US disaster insurance. For instance, the appreciation of the price of US Treasury bonds in 2008 
lifted the value of China’s reserve assets.  
Since 2010, the US and dollar zone have seen parallel developments. With the levelling 
off of China’s surplus after the GFC, the deterioration in the US net international position 
between 2010 and 2016 has found reflection in the dollar zone net investment position.  
While the US and dollar zone positions generally differ, the euro zone’ position differs 
little from that of the euro area proper. Both have approached balance. In effect, Norway’s 
creditor position is more or less balanced against net liabilities in central and eastern Europe 
and elsewhere.  
3.3 Outlook for currency zone current accounts 
Looking forward, the IMF’s April 2018 projections of current accounts, along with unchanged 
currency zone weights, imply that the dollar zone’s current account is on a sharply downward 
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path to 2023. This outcome reflects a projected modest widening of the US current account 
deficit at the centre of the dollar zone. It also reflects a progressive narrowing of mainland 
China’s and a disappearance of Southeast Asia’s current account surpluses. Oil exporters, 
which, other than Russia and Norway, are mostly in the euro zone, are projected to enjoy a 
near-term widening, but then a narrowing of their surpluses, as the price of oil subsides and 
spending catches up with revenues. Taken together, these projections take the dollar zone’s 
projected current account deficit to a share of world GDP last seen in the early 2000s (Figure 
8).  
For its part, the euro zone current account surplus is projected to continue to widen through 
2019, before narrowing slightly into 2023. It bears emphasis that the euro zone surplus at over 
a half percent of global GDP is far wider than the equivalent surpluses with the Deutsche mark 
zone or in the early years of the euro. The yen-zone (essentially the Japanese) current account 
surplus is forecast to dwindle over time from a quarter of a percent of global GDP.  
Thus, in a few years we may look back on the period when the dollar zone current account 
was near balance around the GFC as exceptional. If the IMF’s projections prove accurate and 
if currency zones are stable, dollar zone and euro current accounts could figure in the dynamics 
of the dollar/euro exchange rate as they mostly have not since the euro’s introduction.  
[Insert Figure 8 here] 
 
4 Decomposing global imbalances: across vs within zones  
This section decomposes global current accounts into those across zones and those within zones. 
This decomposition exposes two widely accepted propositions as half-truths. 
The first is that, at least before the GFC, home bias constrained global portfolios less over 
time and that, as a result, the dispersion of current accounts had grown. Greenspan (2003) 
famously mused that an “expanding universe” of portfolios subject to decreasing home bias 
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had made it far easier for countries to finance current account deficits. Faruqee and Lee (2009) 
confirmed that the dispersion of current accounts had been trending higher. In particular, they 
found that in the 45 years, 1960-2005, the sum of absolute values of current accounts as a ratio 
of global GDP had risen from 1.5% to over 5% (Figure 9, solid blue line). For the data through 
2008, the trend line (dashed blue line) suggests that aggregate current accounts increased at the 
rate of 0.88% of global GDP per decade (p-value 0.000). 
[Insert Figure 9 here] 
The proposition was correct, but only a half-truth. There was hardly any trend towards 
wider imbalances across currency zones. On Figure 9 the red line shows the sum of the absolute 
values of currency zone current accounts as a share of global GDP. These show a statistically 
insignificant trend at the rate of only 0.065% per decade (p-value 0.191). Since the Bretton 
Woods era, investors have not been taking on progressively larger currency risks with 
dollar/euro, dollar/yen and euro/yen positions. Instead, the expanding universe seemed 
confined to positions within the dollar and euro zones. For instance, into 2005, China could 
accumulate US Treasury securities with little apparent currency risk. 
The other proposition revealed as half-true is that global imbalances have trended down 
since the GFC. We have updated Faruqee and Lee (2009) through 2016, and the data show a 
sharp contraction in aggregate current accounts since 2006. Over the last ten years aggregate 
current account imbalances have trended down at the rate of 1.54% per decade. This trend has 
seemed to support the idea that global imbalances have diminished  
From the perspective of currency zone current accounts, however, current account 
imbalances have not improved since 2006. If anything, there is a trend towards larger absolute 
values of cross-zone imbalances. The global imbalances that require positions with greater 
currency risk have not decreased since the GFC.16  
                                                     
16 The Japanese public sector has taken on much of the foreign currency exposure from Japan’s current accounts, 
both in the form of official foreign exchange reserves and the government pension fund. Similarly, the Norwegian 
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The divergent trends reflect zone bias in portfolios, as shown in BIS international banking 
and international securities data. In particular, dollar zone investors do favour the dollar in 
investing and borrowing abroad. [FOLLOWING MATERIAL NEEDS WORK] 
That portfolios line up with currency zone membership is evident in the limited national 
data on official foreign exchange holdings and in broader available data on international bank 
deposits and loans as well as on international bond issuance. For 25 economies that disclose at 
least the US dollar share of official foreign exchange reserves, the co-movement with the dollar 
of the respective domestic currency accounts for two thirds of the variation in the dollar share 
of reserves (Figure 10). Thus, dollar zone economies in Latin America and East Asia mostly 
accumulate dollar reserves. Euro zone economies hold lower shares of dollars in their reserves. 
[Insert Figure 10 here] 
For broader samples covering all sectors, the co-movement of domestic currencies with the 
dollar lines up with the currency composition of external assets and liabilities. In particular, 
dollar zone membership lines up with the dollar share of cross-border holdings of bank deposits 
(Figure 11, left-hand panel), of the dollar share of cross-border bank loans (centre panel) and 
the dollar share of international bonds outstanding (right panel).  
[Insert Figure 11 here] 
Why are these relationships so strong? One interpretation is that investing and borrowing 
in the key currency of one’s zone leads to a lower variance of returns, whether on assets or 
liabilities. Zone bias economises on currency risk. 
5. The renminbi as a key currency? 
As noted above, several studies have investigated whether the renminbi is becoming a key 
currency in the sense of attracting currencies that share its movements against major currencies. 
                                                     




The end-November 2015 IMF decision to include the renminbi in the SDR as of October 2016 
added motivation to such studies. Moreover, the reform of the renminbi’s daily fixing in August 
of 2015 took an important step in the lead-up to that decision. Evidence points to its having 
marked a break point, with a greater degree of co-movement observed after then (McCauley 
and Shu (2018)). Can the evidence to date provide some preliminary indication of the effect of 
the renminbi on key currency geography and thereby on the key currency view of global 
imbalances? 
There are good reasons to judge that it is too soon to tell. The renminbi remains tethered 
to the dollar on a daily basis. Its annualized volatility remains in the low single digits, as 
opposed to the high single digits or double-digits of euro/dollar and yen/dollar. In the 2016 
Triennial Survey of Foreign Exchange Turnover, the renminbi’s share of turnover of 4% still 
lagged considerably behind not only that of the dollar and the euro but also the yen (22%), 
sterling (13%) and even the Australian dollar (6%). On this view, consideration of the renminbi 
as a de facto key currency should wait until the results of the 2019 or even the 2022 survey.17  
That said, this section reports the result of a change in our prior from three key currencies 
to four. What effect might this change exert on the size of the dollar zone and its current 
account? It must be emphasized at the outset that in part the exercise answers the question by 
assumption in the treatment of the renminbi as a key currency. This removes Chinese GDP and 
its current account from the dollar or euro zones. The more interesting part of the answer is the 
GDP or current account of third countries that leave the dollar or euro zones and join the 
renminbi zone.  
Based on 2015-17 exchange rates, neighbouring and commodity currencies share most of 
the renminbi’s movements against the dollar. On the assumption that the renminbi is a key 
                                                     
17  IMF (2015) found that the renminbi lagged on share of international bank deposits and bonds as well. 
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currency, this can be interpreted as suggesting a sizeable renminbi zone. We join Tovar and 
Nor (2018) in extending the analysis beyond Asian currencies. We find that not only major 
Asian currencies like the Korean won, Taiwan dollar, Indian rupee, and Indonesian rupiah but 
also commodity currencies. These include the Brazilian real, the Colombian and Mexican pesos 
and the South African rand, as well as many minor Asian and African currencies for a total of 
24 such currencies. Tovar and Nor (2018) find 29 currencies co-moving with the renminbi, but 
characterise it as not an East Asian grouping but rather grouping around the BRICS. We find a 
an important if not exhaustive Asian grouping and do not find that the Russian rouble belongs.  
[Insert Figure 12 here] 
Two qualifications should be added here. First, the August 2015 observations figure 
prominently in this result. Recall that then, the Chinese authorities reformed the renminbi’s 
daily fixing, with the result that the largest monthly change to that date occurred. Emerging 
market currencies tracked the renminbi lower then. However, this is not an outlier to be 
discarded, since the renminbi move represented an autonomous policy move to which other 
currencies responded. Second, and more tellingly, in other months the daily fixing of the 
renminbi/dollar rate was to a varying extent offsetting effective movements of the renminbi 
arising from dollar appreciation or depreciation (McCauley and Shu (2018)). We control for 
two of the largest source of movements of the effective dollar, the euro/dollar and yen/dollar, 
but other currencies consequently have a two-way relationship with the renminbi. For instance, 
sterling’s fairly high beta on the renminbi likely reflects two-way influence.  
Altogether the GDP share of the renminbi zone in 2017 is about 30% of global GDP at 
market prices (Figure 13). This compares to Tovar and Nor (2018) at 15.4%, using a variant of 
Frankel Wei. On the 2015-17 evidence, at least, the renminbi zone comes more at the expense 
of the dollar zone (-20%) than of the euro zone (-5%). Taking this evidence at face value, one 
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can join Tovar and Nor (2018) in concluding that an unequal bipolar world is giving way to an 
unequal tripolar world.  
[Insert Figure 13 here] 
Looking forward, with 2017 weights, the share of the renminbi zone would grow through 
2023 to reach the diminishing share of the dollar zone. This projection is not based on any 
“market share” gain by the renminbi, but rather on the logic of uneven growth: compare China’s 
GDP share with that of the United States.  
Turning now to the current accounts in this tripolar world, on the evidence from 2015-17, 
at least, the dollar zone current account would resemble the US current account of dollar and 
RMB zones. 
[Insert Figure 14 here] 
6. Conclusions 
International finance, in general, and global imbalances in particular, look different when the 
key currencies rather than economies are taken to be the unit of analysis. Contrary to the very 
wide, and to many worrisome, US current account deficit in the mid-2000s, we have shown 
that the dollar zone current account was near balance. Countries whose currencies co-moved 
with the dollar, whose investors therefore saw dollar investments as posing relatively low 
exchange-rate risk, were running current account surpluses that offset the US deficits.  
Looking forward, IMF projections imply that the dollar zone will return to the sizeable 
deficits that were last seen in the mid-1980s. On this view, the dollar zone current account 
deficit would be larger than it has been since the euro came into existence 20 years ago.  
On current evidence, if the renminbi becomes a key currency, it would carry a substantial 
share of global GDP out of the dollar zone. This would leave the dollar zone deficit all the 
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Appendix 1: Country list (172 economies) 
China Oil Exporters Croatia Panama 
Japan Algeria Djibouti Papua New Guinea 





Euro Area countries Brunei Ecuador Poland 
Austria Congo, Rep. Egypt, Arab Rep. Romania 
Belgium  Gabon El Salvador Russian Federation 
Cyprus (2008-) Iran, Islamic Rep. Equatorial Guinea Rwanda 
Estonia (2011-) Iraq Eritrea Sao Tome and Principe 
Finland Libya Ethiopia Samoa 
France Nigeria Fiji Senegal 
Germany Norway Gambia, The Seychelles 
Greece (2001-) Oman Georgia Sierra Leone 
Ireland Qatar Ghana Solomon Islands 




Guatemala Sri Lanka 





Malta (2008-) Venezuela, RB Guyana Swaziland 
Netherlands Other Countries  Haiti Syrian Arab Republic 
Portugal Afghanistan Honduras Tajikistan 
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Slovenia (2009-) Argentina Jordan Tonga 
Spain Armenia Kazakhstan Tunisia 
Other advanced 
economies 
Aruba Kenya Turkey 
Australia Azerbaijan Kiribati Uganda 
Canada Bahamas, The Kuwait Ukraine 
Denmark Bangladesh Kyrgyz Republic Uruguay 
Cyprus Barbados Lao PDR Vanuatu 
Estonia Belarus Lebanon Yemen, Rep. 
Greece Belize Lesotho Zambia 
Iceland Benin Liberia Zimbabwe 
Israel Bhutan Madagascar  
Latvia Bolivia Malawi  
Lithuania Botswana Maldives  
Malta Brazil Mali  
Slovakia Bulgaria Mauritania  
Slovenia Burkina Faso Mauritius  
United Kingdom Burundi Mexico  
Emerging Asia 
Cote d’Ivoire Micronesia, Fed, 
States 
 
Hong Kong Cambodia Moldova  
Indonesia Cameroon Mongolia  
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Malaysia Chad Myanmar  
Philippines Chile Namibia  
Singapore Colombia Nepal  
Taiwan Comoros Nicaragua  
Thailand Congo, Dem. Rep. Niger  
Vietnam Costa Rica Pakistan  
 
Appendix 2: Data descriptions and sources 
Current account balances – Data are extracted from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, 
International Financial Statistics, and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
Nominal GDP – Data are extracted from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook and the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
Currency weights – Estimated as explained in the text with moving 36-month rolling 
regressions, using monthly data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Outliers 
observed for the estimated due to financial or macroeconomic turbulences are deleted on 
a monthly basis. Any significantly negative is assumed to be a missing estimate and a 
statistically insignificant negative is replaced with a value of zero. Likewise, any 
that is significantly no greater than the value of one is replaced with the value of one, while 
significantly greater than one is replaced with a missing variable. Once outliers are 
removed and some estimates are replaced on a monthly basis, they are annually averaged to 
create annual data series.   
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Figure 1: Standard view of global imbalances by country, 1973-2023 (in percent of 
world GDP) 
 
Figure 2: Euro (DM) weights for sterling and commodity currencies 
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Figure 5: Current account balances for the key currency zones, 1973-2023 
(In percent of world GDP) 
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Figure 6: Net International Investment Position by Country, 1970–2016 (in percent of 
world GDP) 
 
Sources: IMF, WEO. 
 
Figure 7: Net Investment Position by Currency Zones, 1970-2016 (In percent of world 
GDP) 
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Figure 9: Aggregate Current Account Imbalances (As a percent of world GDP) 
 
Sources: IMF, WEO and IFS; authors’ calculations 
Figure 10: The dollar’s Pulling Power Influences FX Reserves Allocation1 
 
Notes: 1 Country-specific dollar zone weights plotted against the dollar’s share in the country’s FX reserves, 
2014.   2 Average over four years.   3 For Colombia, New Zealand, Philippines and Turkey, earlier data used. 
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1 Country-specific dollar zone weights plotted against the share of bank deposits, bank loans and residents’ 
debt securities in the corresponding foreign currency totals, 2014. Includes the public sector. 2 Average over 
four years. 
Sources: National data; BIS international debt securities; BIS locational banking statistics; BIS calculations.  
 
Figure 12: Renminbi zone, 2015-17 
[Ask Alan to draw RMB zone on the basis of spreadsheet I assume you want a world map 
like Fig. 3. The data are attached] 
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